In recent years, there have been increasing numbers of alerts for possible imported human cases infected with highly pathogenic viruses (HiPaVs). Striking examples include severe respiratory pathogens (e.g. the SARS or MERS coronavirus) [1](#clm12792-bib-0001){ref-type="ref"} and haemorrhagic fever viruses (e.g. Ebola virus) [2](#clm12792-bib-0002){ref-type="ref"}. Many countries have already implemented disease control measures that include the establishment of specialized facilities such as negative‐air‐pressure isolation rooms for the containment of patients, and reference diagnostic laboratories in which potentially infectious samples can be safely analysed to provide diagnosis and virus characterization. Additionally, protocols have been established for the transportation, reception and management of patients, and the corresponding shipment of biological samples to specialized reference laboratories.

Clearly, the implementation and coordination of these health control measures is complex and expensive. However, importantly, their efficacy in detecting HiPaV patients and providing them with the best medical management remains unproven.

Detection of Cases {#clm12792-sec-0002}
==================

The first objective is to detect and isolate patients infected with HiPaV as rapidly as possible, to reduce the likelihood of human‐to‐human transmission. Accordingly, as viral infections produce a wide range of clinical presentations [3](#clm12792-bib-0003){ref-type="ref"}, [4](#clm12792-bib-0004){ref-type="ref"}, [5](#clm12792-bib-0005){ref-type="ref"}, detection should not be performed only in cases that meet the criteria for severe infection (e.g. haemorrhagic fever), but should rather be extended to febrile syndromes occurring in patients returning from an epidemic area. This has practical implications in terms of the capacity to provide a clinical diagnosis rapidly, for a potentially significant number of patients, and this issue is discussed further below.

Clinical Management {#clm12792-sec-0003}
===================

Previous experience has proven that some suspected cases were actually suffering from treatable infectious diseases, such as bacterial or herpes virus infections, or malaria. Thus, the management of cases possibly infected with an HiPaV should not reduce the efficiency of identifying these patients with specific treatable infections [6](#clm12792-bib-0006){ref-type="ref"}. However, in the vast majority of cases, the medical team cannot gain access to classic biological investigations until the reference laboratory has excluded HiPaV infection. Therefore, the patient may spend a significant period of time without access to basic biological investigations that should guide aetiological treatment or intensive‐care management. In some cases, this may represent a loss of opportunity to save the lives of patients.

When little information is available at the arrival of patients, samples may be sent to hospital laboratories, e.g. for blood counts, biochemistry tests, and/or malaria diagnosis, before the severity of the case is recognized. Paradoxically, this may be beneficial for initial patient management, but obviously represents an unacceptable risk of dissemination when there is an actual HiPaV infection. Possible ways of alleviating these problems are discussed below.

Contribution of Hospital and Reference Laboratories {#clm12792-sec-0004}
===================================================

The ultimate objective must be to be able to distinguish the few potential HiPaV patients from the majority of patients with treatable infections within hours of patient arrival and hospitalization, allowing both the majority of the latter to be reintegrated into standard healthcare pathways and HiPaV patients to be managed in optimal conditions.

This implies that hospital laboratories should whenever possible, perform the first‐line tests for detection of HiPaV infections. This is possible in most cases, when the diagnosis relies on real‐time PCR or RT‐PCR detection of the viral genome in biological samples, because such tests are easy to standardize and highly reproducible (and many already exist in the form of commercial kits) [7](#clm12792-bib-0007){ref-type="ref"}, [8](#clm12792-bib-0008){ref-type="ref"}, [9](#clm12792-bib-0009){ref-type="ref"}. Moreover, hospital laboratories, most often, already have considerable experience in using them. This, however, raises considerable biosecurity issues. The introduction of dedicated, biologically safe sampling techniques that automatically inactivate the sample at the patient\'s bedside would be of great value in this context, and their development should be encouraged and actively supported by health authorities. This would greatly increase the speed of the diagnostic process, as patients with a suspicion of HiPaV infection could be safely tested by the use of standard laboratory and sample transportation protocols.

The transfer of first‐line diagnosis to a number of qualified hospital laboratories represents, in the medium term, a strategic reorientation similar to that implemented previously for a number of pathogens, including influenza virus. It is not expected to modify, in depth, the prerogatives of national reference laboratories. They will remain key for establishing and validating standard operation procedures for this first‐line diagnosis, organizing external quality assessment programmes, and performing all additional investigations, such as genetic characterization, virus isolation, serological testing, and collection and interpretation of epidemiological information. The national reference laboratories would also be able to help in developing innovative sampling and inactivation procedures that could make the diagnostic process in hospitals safer and faster.

Conclusion {#clm12792-sec-0005}
==========

Here, we have briefly considered: (i) the currently increasing number of alerts for HiPaV cases imported into non‐epidemic regions of the world; (ii) the possibility that future episodes may involve larger numbers of patients and the requirement for detecting all forms of infection, whatever the clinical presentation, to break the potential chains of transmission [10](#clm12792-bib-0010){ref-type="ref"}; and (iii) the current time delay in reintegrating patients into standard healthcare pathways. Accordingly, we advocate that the infrastructural and logistic reorganization proposed here could be crucial for the future improved implementation of the clinical management of patients potentially infected with HiPAVs. Urgent actions are required to be prepared to keep the problem under control in case of a health crisis of larger magnitude.
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